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CIVIL PROCEDURE IN LOW EARTH ORBIT: SCIENCE
FICTION, AMERICAN INDIANS AND FEDERAL COURTS
ROBERT LAURENCE*
Is it not immediately obvious that following the Columbus quincentennary more attention should be paid to what is written in science fiction
novels? Perhaps not. Those of us who teach, study and write about
American Indian law are famous for our over-developed ability to see
Indian issues in all areas of the law, indeed in all areas of life. Indian
law and science fiction? You bet.
Much of the literature of science fiction has always dealt with issues
of legal relevance: Outsiders vs. insiders. Us vs. them. Discoverors vs.
discoverees. Those in control vs. others thought inferior, non-human,
even. Explorers vs. stayers-at-home. Colonists vs. natives. The center vs.
the provinces. Sometimes, as in Melinda M. Snodgrass's novel Circuit,'
insider-outsider legal issues are explicitly raised; more commonly they are
found only incidently, between the lines, between blast-offs, if you will.
Either way, such legal issues commonly inhabit the pages of science
fiction. And, let it be noted, because these are the very issues dealt with
by American Indians since Columbus showed up, they remain the issues
of today, and of the next 500 years.
There are no Indians in Circuit and little-though some 2-in the way
of Indian law. Thus, the book is not, explicitly, "American Indian Law

* Robert A. Leflar Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.
1. MELINDA M. SNODGRASS, CIRCUIT (1986). Other science fiction work by Ms. Snodgrass has
been subject to law review commentary in Paul R. Joseph & Sharon F. Carton, The Law of the
Federation: Images of Law, Lawyers, and the Legal System in "Star Trek: The Next Generation,"
24 U. TOL. L. REV. 43 (1992). Ms. Snodgrass was a screen writer for several episodes of that
television series. See infra note 6.
Melinda Snodgrass was a classmate of mine at the University of New Mexico School of Law
more than a decade ago. I, like she, as reported in the "Acknowledgments" section of the book,
was a student of Fred Ragsdale and the late Jerrold Walden, who were beginning (Ragsdale) and
ending (Walden) their law teaching careers during our tenure there. And finally, I am a sciencefiction reader to whom the idea of batting around the notion of a 21st century legal system is a
tasty idea indeed. So if you decide that you are dealing here with someone predisposed to liking
this book, so be it. At least I warned you. That on several levels the book disappointed me is
part of the essay that follows. That, in the end, Ms. Snodgrass has given people interested in Indian
law something to think about, and vice versa, is the reason for the essay.
2. There actually is a fair amount of explicit Indian law in Circuit, in addition to the analogies
mentioned in the text. There is certainly more than one would expect in a science fiction novel;
one suspects that this is Fred Ragsdale's influence. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), are related by Jenny, partly to
demonstrate "the innate powerlessness of the judiciary." SNODGRASS, supra note I, at 120. The
famous quotation of President Jackson that "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him
enforce it" is given. Id. (Some think the story of that quotation apocryphal; I have always thought
it unlikely that Andy Jackson ever spoke with semi-colons. See generally the classic and exhaustive
work on these landmark cases, Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics
and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969)). Also, the so-called Insular Cases, in particular Hawaii
v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903), are discussed. SNODGRASS, supra note 1, at 34-35. Finally, Judge
Huntington lectures the President that "[g]reat nations like great men must keep their word." Id.
at 131. This changes only slightly (from "should" to "must"). Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora
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in Space." 3 Rather, Circuit is a story about life, love and federal courts
in the next century. Nonetheless, it leads to some thoughts about today's
law, and the role that American Indians play in it. In the end, the
quincentennary, the body of American Indian law and Ms. Snodgrass's
novel are all about the toleration, or not, of diversity. About the ability,
or not, and the underlying wisdom, of the dominant society's control
of the subordinate ones. About whether, or not, and how, if at all, the
center governs the provinces.
This essay is not, exactly, a book review. The book has been out too
long for that. Furthermore, Circuit is only the first third of a trio of
science fiction books. 4 I find the other two less interesting, jurisprudentially speaking, than the first, and will not be discussing them here. Some
of the essay will surely be review-like, but my purpose here is beyond
that of the usual book review. An author who writes of 21st century
law writes as much, I think, about now as then. And the audience is
wide. And young. And unsuspecting that a lesson in the law of today
is being taught. Such lessons are often well-learned and deserve serious
inspection here, on these otherwise scholarly pages.
Professors Carolyn Heilbrun and Judith Resnik have written of the
idea of law and literature, and they identify three different aspects of
the study: (1) Law in literature; (2) Law as literature and (3) Canonicity.'
This essay is of the first kind, premised on Heilbrun and Resnik's notion
that what is written about the law in literature becomes, in fact, part
of the law.
Ms. Snodgrass herself downplays the influence that screenwriters and
other writers of popular fiction have on the law, lawmakers, and law

Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960). The idea may be Holmesian in origin, as Ms. Snodgrass
suggests, SNODGRASS, supra note 1, at 131, but I got it from Justice Black; it is the last sentence
of his dissent in Tuscarora. Black does not attribute it to Holmes.
3. There is a large body of science fiction dealing explicitly with the very essence of American
Indian law, to wit the cultural interface between very different intelligent cultures. For a particularly
disheartening discussion of this situation, see FREDERICK POHL, JEM (1980).
4. See MELINDA M. SNODGRASS, CIRCUIT BREAKER (1987); MELINDA M. SNODGRASS, FINAL CIRCUIT
(1988).
5. Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnik, Convergences: Law, Literature and Feminism, 99 YALE
L.J. 1913, 1936 (1990). "Canonicity" is defined by the authors as the study of "who is given
voice, who cited, quoted, repeated, and who marginalized, ignored, submerged." Id. On the question
of whether the "canon" should be opened to permit others, particularly women, or, instead, simply
abandoned altogether, see Margaret Atwood, Not Just a Pretty Face, THE WOMEN'S REVIEW OF
BooKs, Jan. 1994, at 7:
The use of the word "canon" for the list of works accepted as central by academia
is no accident: "canon" is an ecclesiastical term, and to be canonized is to be
sainted, ready for celebration at the hands of the priesthood. The drawback to
membership in any priestly cult is that the circle tends to be a closed one-closed
to the profane outer world, that is-and that it defines itself by its vocabulary,
which leans toward specialization and jargon and shibboleth. That is, to be accepted
by the priests you have to talk like them. Academic criticism, as practiced by both
women and men, has tended to become in the last decade opaque to the general
reader. Wonderful things get spoken about in there, no doubt, back behind the
choir screen, but it would be nice for the rest of us to know what they are. Women
have a lot of practice in the Emperor's Clothes department. They might well take
a crack at cleaning up and simplifying the reverend vocabulary, and at getting
some of the con out of deconstruction.
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consumers. Writing in the magazine Omni, she criticized Gene Roddenberry, the creator of the Star Trek series, for getting too full of himself
and his show: "The dreadful effect of all the [Star Trek] hype was that
Roddenberry decided he could no longer just do a television show so
he could make some money. Now he had to speak to the ages because
'6
this was serious shit, this was philosophy. And, after comparing the
two Star Trek series-and finding the second one lacking -she wondered:
"Is it important? Does it matter? No. As I said while on Star Trek:
'We ain't eradicatin' world hunger here. It's just
The Next Generation,
' '7
show.
a TV
Of course, both she and the professors are right. She is right that
writers of popular legal fiction by definition are writing popular fiction,
not law reviews, and they shouldn't forget it. But Professors Heilbrun
and Resnik are right, too, that the law as it is found in literature, even
in popular fiction and TV, still has an enormous impact on the way the
law is perceived by non-lawyers, and that much more so when it doesn't
read like philosophy.8 Is it important? Does it matter? Of course it is.
Of course it matters. What is said in television shows like Star Trek and
books like Circuit influences the way people, especially young people,
think about the law. Circuit may not eradicate world hunger, but in its
own very real way it shapes the law more than what is written on these
scholarly pages.
I turn, then, to the story that is found in Circuit. Ms. Snodgrass's
book contains quite a tale. It is, on various levels, an action-thriller, a
political intrigue, a love story and a jurisprudential musing. Circuit is
9
set in the middle of the next century. The earth is overcrowded, hungry
0 still under the domination of the usual superpowers.
and energy poor,'
(Ms. Snodgrass did not, in Circuit, anticipate the events of the last few
years in the Soviet Bloc, but then, who did?) "The System," that is to
say the body of Earthlings who live off the planet, is made up of folks
living in Earth-orbiting satellites, miners and smelters on the Moon, Mars
colonists and, on out, Asteroid miners.
The Western part of the System-groundling geo-politically speakingis mostly run by corporate America, the government having shed all
except military interest in space back in the 20th century." It is an

6. Melinda M. Snodgrass, Boldly Going Nowhere?, OmNi, Dec. 1991, at 52.
7. Id.; cf. David Freeman, Shouts and Murmurs: A Hollywood Lexicon, THE NEW YORKER,
Feb. 28, 1994, at 102 (quoting Alfred Hitchcock to Ingrid Bergman: "[Ilt's only a movie, Ingrid.").
I seem to find myself suddenly surrounded by such professional self-deprecations, e.g., David A.
Kaplan & Daniel Pedersen, The Best Happy Ending, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 1994, at 44 (quoting
Harry Jansen to his son, the ice skater: "Dan, there's more to life than skating in a circle.").
8. Professor Heilbrun is on both sides of this debate-if she sees it as a debate-for she also
writes popular mysteries under the name "Amanda Cross."
9. The date of the events is never given precisely, but appears to be 2050. See SNODGRASS,
supra note 1, at 29.
10. Id. at 10.
11. Id.
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underpopulated land 2 of meritocracy and libertarianism. Alternative dispute resolution runs amuck. 3
The American president, Tomas C. de Baca, wishes to reestablish
governmental control over the resolution of these disputes, and through
that to groundling domination of the System as a whole. He chooses as
his vehicle the newly created 15th Circuit Court and he names as its
judge a crony named Cabot Huntington, whose features are as patrician
as his name. Huntington is a corporate and constitutional lawyer, with
a heavy predisposition against alternate dispute resolution: when the
President describes the colonists' corporate-run civil justice system, Huntington responds, immediately and without amplification, "[t]hose will
have to go."' 4 So the new judge departs for Enersun I, an earth-orbiting
colony, with his junior partner, now his law clerk, Jenny McBride, intent
upon doing away with corporate justice and instituting good old AngloAmerican civil procedure.
Meanwhile, on the Moon, several Russian miners, dreaming of consumer
goodies and free enterprise freedom, plan to sell the fruits of their
collective's labor to U.S. Steel, instead of shipping it back home to the
U.S.S.R.' 5 This show of dissidence irks the Russian Premier, who persuades the U.S. President to bring suit in Judge Huntington's 15th Circuit,
U.S. v. U.S. Steel, to enjoin the deal as a violation of some U.N.
treaty.16 The President is pleased to do this as the colonists are snubbing
his new judge' 7 and stubbornly continuing to resolve their disputes privately. '1
The merits of the suit, we are led to understand, are just short of
frivolous. 19 Nevertheless, the judge backs his friend the President and
grants the injunction. Jenny, who is sharing quarters, but not beds, with
the judge, moves out in protest, and in with the handsome young colonist
20
she is dating.

Thereafter, the Russian Premier, with a wink and a nod from the
President 2I and permission to use U.S. airspace on the Moon, 22 nukes
12. The space colony on which most of the action in Circuit takes place, Enersun I, is inhabited
by ten thousand persons and is described as at "top capacity." Id. at 18. Still, this top capacity
seems to have a comfortable roominess. Id. at 32. Of course, some immigration control must be
exerted if Earth is over-crowded and space is roomy, and so it seems; there is a waiting list of
twenty-thousand to settle in Enersun I. Id. at 18. Of course one need not look all the way into
the 21st century to observe the situation in which the huddled masses are admitted only grudgingly
through the golden door to breathe free in relatively wide-open spaces.
13. Professors Joseph and Carton note the informality of the dispute resolution system in Star
Trek: The Next Generation. See Joseph & Carton, supra note 1,at 50, which may be Ms. Snodgrass's
influence on the screenplay.
14. SNODGRASS, supra note 1, at 12; see also id.at 19, 33, 69.
15. Id. at 1-3.
16. Id. at 52-56.
17. Id. at 41.
18. The first private civil law suit is not brought in the 15th Circuit until more than halfway
through the book and not until after the judge begins to show a little independence from the Earth.
Id. at 124.
19. Id. at 61-62.
20. Id. at 109.
21. d. at 87.
22. I know, I know, but what is the alternative? "Vacuumspace?" "Spacespace?" "Airspace"
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nipping lunar capitalism in the bud. 23 One
the offending collective,
24
family escapes death.

The judge then has a change of heart. He double-crosses the President
and, when a survivor of the attack sues the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. for
reparations-where else? in the 15th Circuit-the judge returns to Earth
and digs up the evidence of U.S. complicity. He eventually decides the
case against the governments and also saves the life of the plaintiff from
under instructions to ice the poor guy
the President's goons, who are
25
and deprive him of standing.
In the end, the colonists and the judge gain mutual respect, Jenny
moves back in, and there looms ahead Huntington's impeachment trial
and C. de Baca's reelection bid, the outcomes of both of which we can
anticipate with some certainty. 26 And there are two sequels lying ahead.
In the end, the last sentences of the trilogy suggest where libertarians
and patriots must flee to get away from the rest of us and our governments: "Cab walked to the window, considered the million million
suns burning beyond the snow-filled sky. Turned back, and raised his
glass. 'To freedom.'

'27

As an action-thriller, Circuit has much to recommend. There is a
gunfight at Enersun corral made more interesting by high tech, self28
propelled bullets and indistinguishable cowpokes in identical space suits.

There is some Saul Alinski-style nonviolent resistance, ultimately disrupted

it will have to be.
23. Id. at 93-94. Twelve people die. Id. at 94-97, 126. The Gulf War has shown us, post-Circuit,
that such uses of force are often subject to vigorous debate; I think it fair to say that Ms. Snodgrass
intends the retribution in Circuit to be seen as far exceeding that deserved. Judge Huntington clearly
does: "Among those freedoms [which Franklin Roosevelt enumerated in his famous Four Freedoms
speech] was the freedom from want, which was all that the inhabitants of the Garmoneya Collective
were pursuing." Id. at 226-27. As to what the Russian neo-entrepreneurs wanted: "Each member
of the collective had purchased some new and frivolous object in addition to the desperately needed
equipment." Id. at 57.
24. This is the family of the original Russian instigator of the capitalist scheme, the Renkos.
SNoDGAss, supra note 1, at 57.
25. See generally id. at 124-232. This, of course, is nearly half of the book. I have collapsed
the story severely so that there will still be some excitement for the reader.
I am not making up the part about standing, as the President, a lawyer, contemplates exactly
that approach to the problem, id. at 205. In a related development, the government's lawyer makes
an ex parte attack on the plaintiff's standing while he still is alive, on more traditional legal grounds.
The argument, somewhat condensed:
Mr. Malcomb: "Renko has no standing to bring this case. He has suffered no
personal harm in this case. He wasn't killed at that collective and he lost no
relatives in that attack. Therefore there is no justiciable controversy."
The Court: "... I'm unmoved by your argument, and couldn't you come up with
something better than a standing issue for God's sake?"
Mr. Malcomb [stiffly]: "It's a valid issue."
The Court: "You're right, I agree it is, but I'm not going to use it to deny Mr.
Renko his day in court. This case is too important, and it touches on too many
basic human rights to be avoided by a cheap trick like this. Legal technicalities
have been used too often to deny justice to the people. It's not going to happen
this time."
Id. at 126 (emphasis in the original).
26. Id. at 231-32.
27. SNODGRASS, FINAL CIRCUIT, supra note 4, at 244.
28. SNODGRASS, supra note 1, at 216.
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by Rooski tear gas.2 9 There is a capitalist-socialist barroom brawl to

protect the honor of an harassed waitperson.3 0 And, best of all, there

is a Tae Kwan Do demonstration by the federal judge in a spaceport
restroom, where the judge lays low an armed MP half his honor's age. a"
As a love story, too, Circuit delivers. First, we have a beautiful,
twentysomething dancer-turned-lawyer-turned-law clerk: the green-eyed,
piquant-faced, red-haired Jenny McBride. 32 Jenny is seriously disenchanted
with life, is bored with lawyers, if not the law, and is frustrated by
33
Earthside practice.
So, we have a pretty, disillusioned young lawyer. Next, we have a
fortyish son of the Ambassador to the United Kingdom: the corporate
lawyer and politico,3 4 Cabot Huntington. And we have a young, extraordinarily handsome and slightly revolutionary off-worlder: Peter Traub.
Jenny and Cab share respect and an apartment on Enersun I, but, except
for some law library shoulder rubbing 3 and seat switching body contact, 36
they begin the story platonically. Peter enters the picture initially as a
mole for the colonial establishment, his mission to woo Jenny so that
she might sway Cab to the off-world view. 7 They hit it off, initially in

29. 1 recall from the 1960's a plan by the community activist mentioned in the text to make
unpleasant a visit to Chicago by a massive sit-in in the pay toilets at O'Hare Airport. The scheme
in reverse is found in Circuit, directed at the Earthside occupation forces. Id. at 180.
30. Id. at 162-64.
31. Id. at 200-01. It takes two blows.
32. Id. at 7. "Piquant" is Ms. Snodgrass's word and means "appealingly provocative" as well
as its more common "pleasantly pungent." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 997 (1st ed. 1969).
33. "Out here I thought I might be able to finally put together what it is that the law is
supposed to do, to represent." SNODGRASS, supra note 1, at 42. Her boss, the judge, finds it
somewhat surprising that Jenny ever became a lawyer in the first place:
In some circles her honesty would have been lauded, but in the world of the legal
brotherhood it was a drawback. She had never learned how to close one eye, and
go along to get along ....
Sometimes Cabot wondered why she had become a
lawyer and why she stuck with it now that she knew what the world was like.
More to the point he wondered why he had ever hired her ....
Id. at 14.
This view of lawyers is none too attractive and, one suspects, it may be Ms. Snodgrass's own.
The view of judicial ethics is no better, as the judge kowtows to the President, id. at 63-64, hobnobs
with the counsel on one side of a pending case, id. at 70-71, and, later, sits to hear a case even
after he has actively engaged in obtaining the evidence for one side, id. at 224-27. (Granted, the
judge does first consider having himself replaced on the bench so that he can testify for the plaintiff,
id. at 202-03, but later he abandons that plan and hears the case.)
It is true enough that Circuit embodies a certain respect for the law, but the legal profession
itself takes something of a beating. An engineer, like Jenny's friend Peter Traub, seems just as
familiar with the law as any lawyer, cites cases like a second year law student, id. at 34, and is
a good deal more ethical than many of the law-trained people in the book.
I do not take the position, of course, either in this essay or more generally, that Ms. Snodgrass
has an obligation to portray the legal profession in any particularly flattering light. I only note
that Circuit makes a portrayal that many of us, I suppose, would find rather gloomy.
34. Id. at 86. Although the "politico" characterization is by one of the judge's early critics, a
Systemite journalist, id., the characterization does seem apt for the friend of the President whose
family is actively political. See id. at 205.
35. Id. at 110.
36. Id. at 7.
37. Id. at 26-27.
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the de rigueur weightless tryst.38 I will not reveal the resolution of this
cosmic love triangle, only to note that 20th century readers will find
21st century romance comfortably familiar.
Jurisprudentially, though, if not romantically, Circuit is about difference
and the role that a federal court plays in the control, or not, of that
difference. And in the book, these legal differences are sharply drawn.
At the center, the Earth-bound Americans are corrupt, disingenuous and
wimpish toward the Russians.3 9 The Earth-bound Russians are coldblooded and heavy-handed and unrepentant of it. President C. de Baca
and Premier Tupolev are a matched set: walking, telephoning embodiments
of how the maxim "Power Corrupts" translates into English and Russian.
In contrast to the Earthsiders, the Systemites represent the best hope
of humankind. The Russian miners are sturdy, loving, hard-working stock,
exploited by their masters. As for the Americans in space, they are freewheeling individualists, living in a libertarian utopia, as Peter explains
to Jenny:
Peter: We are free from what I consider real vices, such as slums,
pollution and over-crowding, [although alcohol distribution is pretty

much unregulated].
Jenny: I see your point.

Peter: This is part of what I meant about freedom up here. People
basically do what they want just so long as they don't do any physical

or financial damage to anyone else.4
Libertarians Unite: You have nothing to lose but gravity! It is in this
libertarianism that the System contrasts so dramatically with the central
government of the groundlings, and it is here that the Systemites feel
themselves most threatened by federal court authority. It is here, then,
that the analogy to American Indian law begins to take shape, so I must
pause to make clear the extent of Systemite libertarianism.

38. It would, I think, be indiscreet to give a citation to this page, as it would be in poor taste
for a reader to turn immediately to the episode.
Ms. Snodgrass adds a certain kinkiness to the event by placing it in a well-mirrored and, one
would think, rather public dance/exercise room in the satellite's hub. The dance room, we are told,
doubles, with the mirrors retracted, as a handball court. There is no greater shortcoming to Circuit
than its failure to give us an idea of the rules of such a fascinating game as weightless handball;
as this is a failure to spell out rules and regulations, I might even call this omission a jurisprudential
shortcoming.
I should note that the sex in Circuit is neither explicit nor gratuitous, putting Ms. Snodgrass in
the minority of modern writers; were it a movie, Circuit would be rated PG. It is clear that while
Cab and Jenny sleep near one another, they do not sleep together, nor do they do that for which
"sleep" is a common enough English euphemism. Jenny and Peter do, relatively regularly, but Ms.
Snodgrass leaves the details to our imaginations. The sequels to Circuit are more nearly X-rated
and demand less imagination.
39. Throughout Circuit, the United States is shown to lack the gumption to stand up to the
Soviet Union. Ms. Snodgrass recites a little future history: "In the early days of lunar exploration,
the Soviets had bullied through their claims to some of the richest mineral deposits on the Moon,
and as was usually the case in the dealings between the superpowers, the United States had quietly
acquiesced." Id. at 58; see also id. at 55, 59. All of this, of course, was written before either the
Gulf War or the "collapse of communism."
40. Id. at 32.
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As an example of the libertarianism of Circuit, so-called "victimless"
acts are non-criminal in space. For example, prostitution is not only
legal, but has lost both its immorality and any stigma that it exploits

women. It has become just good natured and friendly free-enterprise in
short-term bodily easements; mercantilism in genital usufructs. 41 The madam of a prominent bordello is a well-respected citizen and one of the
non-judicial dispute resolvers.42 The madam, Artis Barnes, characterizes
Jenny as "a perfectly sensible woman who understands that what occurs
between two or more consenting adults is nobody's business" and offers
her employment as a whore. 43 Jenny declines with a smile; if she isn't
exactly flattered, neither is she shocked nor offended." To have sex with
strangers for cash seems to be part of what every girl might consider a
career move. Not since television's "Gunsmoke" have I seen such an
optimistic portrayal of the charms of prostitution.
It is unclear to me why such libertarian nonsense is so attractive to

science fiction writers, 45 but it serves our law review purpose here by
presenting a shiarp contrast with Earthside communitarianism. Perhaps
its science fiction popularity is because the doctrine appears to advance
the interests of the free spirits that the writers assume will initially explore

the planets. 46 But, of course, libertarianism-at least Ms. Snodgrass's
fictional variety-answers none of the hard questions. One wonders if

smoking is permitted in public places on Enersun I? Is there a minimum
wage? An income tax? Is sexual harassment permitted in the workplace? 47

41. Id. at 69-70.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 36.
44. Id.
45. The late Robert A. Heinlein is the classic science fiction libertarian. The writer Spider
Robinson, a fellow traveller, wrote in his gushing homage to Heinlein, "I know it sounds crazy,
but I've heard 'libertarian' used as a pejorative a few times lately." Spider Robinson, RAH RAH
R.A.H.!, in TIME TRAVELLERS STRICTLY CASH 103 (1981). It is difficult to imagine that adherents
to any other political philosophy would have the arrogance to be surprised to learn that there are
those unpersuaded by their version of what's right.
46. And vice versa. See 1992 NATIONAL PLATFORM OF THE LIBERTARIAN PARTY 23 (1991):
Space Exploration. We oppose all government restrictions upon voluntary peaceful
use of outer space. We condemn all international attempts to prevent or limit
private exploration, industrialization, and colonization of the moon, planets, asteroids, satellite orbits, Ijagrange libration points, or any other extra-terrestrial
resources. We specifically call for the repudiation of the U.N. Moon Treaty. We
support the abolition of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and
the privatization of all artificial satellites.
47. I mentioned above a barroom fight in Circuit. See supra text accompanying note 30. Given
the anti-PC mood in the country today, it is probably necessary to point out that the groundlings
were the harassers and the Systemites rally to the defense of the waitress. With libertarianism
rampant on Enersun I, it is a little surprising that the anti-PC Systemites didn't in fact fight to
defend the harasser's right to speak freely, and didn't tell the waitress to chill out and can't she
take a little joking around? Today's-style libertarianism is certainly of the view that white guys
should get to speak their minds, and girls and colored people should be taught to have thicker
skins. See, e.g., 1992 NATIONAL PLATFORM OF THE LIBERTARIAN PARTY 6 (1991): "Language that
is deemed offensive to certain groups is not a cause for legal action." Enersun-style libertarianism,
on the other hand, allows punching someone whose speech offends. Perhaps this is what is meant
by the "marketplace of ideas." See generally Taylor, Are You Politically Correct?, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 1991, at 32.
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Is creation science taught in school? Are there public schools? Compulsory
education? These matters are never raised, though I note that in one
odd sentence Ms. Snodgrass suggests without amplification that practitioners of fundamentalist religions and 4 other believers in creation science
might never venture into space at all. 1
Even with respect to prostitution, which is raised, there is no pause
to consider that women might be forced into the trade by poverty or
pimps, or that something might happen once the curtain is pulled that
would be beyond the ability of the woman to control. Circuit in this
regard is "Pretty Woman in Space"; a49 deal's a deal, as if that were
the most fundamental principle of law.
Circuit leaves little room for hesitation in choosing between the political
and legal systems represented by East, West and Sky. The corporate
moguls of space and their lawyers are the true and admirable patriots,
not the Earth-bound elected officials or their appointees and certainly
not the Commie totalitarians. U.S. Steel's attorneys, an inscrutable Japanese man and a radical Chicana,50 outshine the government's in both
skill and grace. Enersun I's chief administrative officer is a straighttalking, quick-thinking Asian-American woman who oozes competence.
The Enersun I cabal that resists the Earthside Americans tempers its
revolution with a good measure of respect for law and order.,,
In Circuit, the good guys prevail. Right conquers both left and wrong.
And, as the coup de grace of that conquest occurs in Judge Huntington's
federal courtroom, we come at last to the explicit jurisprudence of Circuit.
Thus, the basic tenets of System life are: libertarianism, the right to
be left alone and the notion, so common in science fiction writing, that
the best government is the one that lets the cream rise to the top. Rewards
in space go to the smart, the hard-working, the strong. Smart people
get ahead, unhindered by such irrational and unsavory aspects of human
nature as discrimination, greed, bigotry or intolerance. These characteristics seem bound to Earth by gravity. Left to themselves, Systemites
believe, the best will get ahead, and those with lesser talents will have
the good sense to be satisfied with smaller rewards.
The United States Constitution is respected as the bulwark of such a
meritocracy; the Bill of Rights is, at any rate. That document is revered
52
by the Systemites even to the extent of the Third Amendment. But

48. SNODGRASS, supra note 1, at 30.
49. But see Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 195 (1987).
50. SNODGRASS, supra note 1, at 71-73. Angela Martinez, junior attorney for U.S. Steel, has a
memorable exchange with the judge at a pre-trial social event. She glowers and refuses to shake
the judge's hand, calls the suit "harassment" and suggests that the judge recuse himself. Huntington
responds: "Nonsense! It's ridiculous to pull someone off another bench just to hear this case. It's
not that important." Id. at 73.
51. See id. at 172-78.
52. One of the few post-1986 cases Ms. Snodgrass discusses, Van Clive v. Odell, is one to be
decided by the Supreme Court under that amendment. Assuming that you need to be reminded,
as I did, that amendment states: "No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
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Peter Traub calls the body of the Constitution "baggage." 53 The Interstate
Commerce Clause, at least in our late 20th century view as empowering
Congress to do pretty much anything it likes,5 4 would probably be the
most offensive part of that baggage."
If the modern Commerce Clause of the Constitution is the Systemites'
worst federalist nightmare come true, the Just Compensation Clause of
the Fifth Amendment should be their best friend. That clause is not
mentioned in the book, but one guesses that its shield against grasping
government and socialist reform would be especially dear to the colonists.
Free enterprise reigns supreme.
Into this paradise of justice, fairness and profit comes the federal court
system, unwanted by the colonists, and for just cause, as we who are
privy to the President's thoughts know, for he is out thereby to shorten
their leash. And it is exactly here that Circuit takes a fascinating jurisprudential turn and makes one confront the place that federal courts
hold in a federal government. It is exactly here that Circuit becomes
something more than a futuristic, libertarian potboiler and becomes worthy
of law review commentary. For it is here that the center attempts to
control the provinces, using the federal courts as the tool.
Defending centralized authority to the provinces is rarely an easy task,
and Jenny's initial attempt meets with little success. After Peter Traub
explains to her that there are no victimless crimes in the System, she
responds:
"I think I could get used to that idea, but I'm not sure how the
authorities Earthside would regard it."
"Frankly," Peter said, ....
"what business is it of theirs?"
"It's best to have as uniform a legal system as possible."
"Why?"

without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law."
In the year 2020, during what Ms. Snodgrass calls, with some prescience, the "Kuwait Emergency,"
the U.S. Air Force occupied a privately owned Earth satellite "(i]n an effort to monitor Soviet/
Saudi action both on the ground and in space." Such a decision might have required the Supreme
Court to interpret the word "war" in the amendment and perhaps a narrow definition kept the
"Kuwait Emergency" from being one, but we aren't given any details.
53. Id. at 34.

54. Oh, I don't know. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
55. Circuit has a short discussion of the Commerce Clause in the context of the arguments in
United States v. U.S. Steel. Counsel for U.S. Steel, Mr. Furakawa, argues that the injunction
should fail because it would be beyond the Commerce Clause power of the Congress to regulate
such a transaction between a Russian collective and an American corporation. If correct, the Commerce
Clause in 2050 will have a much narrower application than it does in 1993. The judge remarks in
his decision that "this case does not fall within the traditional boundaries of the commerce power,"
but grants the injunction in any case.
To a lawyer, United States v. U.S. Steel does not look like a Commerce Clause case. No statute
of Congress is being attacked; no Systemite rule is argued to be repugnant to the so-called "dormant
Commerce Clause" which reserves the regulation of certain activities to Congress. Nevertheless, I
do not criticize Ms. Snodgrass for her mention of the Commerce Clause for I know that her
audience lies elsewhere than with lawyers, and that United States v. U.S. Steel rings true enough
for that audience.
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Startled, Jenny [said], "Well, because, . . . , because ... " She
stopped, realizing she didn't have a satisfactory answer.
"Look Jennifer, most of the blue laws are on the books because a7
handful of people with rigid religious or moral beliefs want them
there. And why they should be allowed to impose their attitudes on
everyone else is beyond me. The other reason for blue laws is because
the government finds them highly lucrative. Take a look at the drug
laws."
I
"I'd rather not. I know what you're going to say and, frankly,
'
haven't got a single argument that would successfully rebut it. 56
Jenny's initial notion that uniformity should control at diversity's
expense could have been defended, if she had tried. She might have
countered Peter's "blue laws" example with her own examples of localized
race discrimination or religious intolerance. She might have mentioned
Governor Faubus's attempts to keep Little Rock's schools segregated,"1
58
or Texas's attempt to restrict Ms. Roe's abortion, or Pawtucket, Rhode
59
Island's attempt to construct a public display of religion, or Richmond,
6
Virginia's attempt to set aside certain contracts for minorities. 0 Different
people feel differently about the outcomes of these cases, but together
they suggest the legitimacy of Jenny's call for uniformity governed by
the center: about certain matters, we would all agree, we are in this
together, and the federal courts have a role to play in ensuring that.
But recall Peter's speech, given above, which begins "We are free from
",61 Peter and the other libertarians aboard
what I consider real vices .....
Enersun I find themselves in political heaven, where nothing as unsavory
as bigotry or intolerance exists. Of course, it is generally true that the
majority of local folk find the problems that central authorities set out
to solve as no problems at all.
Apropos of Indian law, the idea of the insertion by the dominant
society of a legal system into the frontier in order to subjugate the
frontier society is a new one in neither fact nor fiction. The twist in
Circuit is the emphasis on the civil, rather than the criminal, side. The
conversation between Jenny and Peter quoted immediately above might
suggest that the colonists fear the imposition of a code making criminal
6
some actions their libertarianism finds acceptable and protected. 1
A comparison can be drawn to the real events of American expansion
into Indian country and the ways in which Congress came to impose

56. SNODGRASS, supra note 1, at 32-33. Peter's point about the drug laws is less clear to me
than it is to Jenny, but it appears that the "just say 'no' approach to drug abuse survives in
Circuit's future. This attitude is of a piece, I think, with Ms. Snodgrass's optimism about the future
of racism and prostitution, and seems in tune with the Republican notion, caught best by the "just
say 'no' slogan, that the best solution to a problem is the simplistic one, and the one that requires
the least attention and resources from the government.
57. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958).
58. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
59. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
60. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
61. SNODGRASS, supra note I, at 32.
62. Like harassing waitresses? See supra note 47 and my short tirade against anti-correctness.
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criminal sanctions on Indian behavior. 63 For example, compare Ex Parte
Crow Dog with United States v. Kagama.65 In Crow Dog, the Supreme
Court granted the habeas corpus petition of an Indian convicted in federal
court of committing murder in Indian country. This was no federal crime,
the Court said, unless Congress makes it one. 66 Congress quickly did so,
enacting the Major Crimes Act, now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153. The
Supreme Court upheld the validity of that act in Kagama, which is
unsurprising, given the invitation in Crow Dog. Since that time the scope
of the Major Crimes Act has been broadened and other statutes have
been added,67 so that most criminal activity by Indians on Indian reservations is regulated by the federal government and most prosecutions
are in federal court. This, in turn, means that today's Indians will bear
the enormous brunt of any federal death penalty, but they have little
representation in the bodies that will enact that law. As with the American
Indians, the Systemites might be understandably concerned about such
dilution of their sovereignty and threat to their lives.
This is not the trail that Ms. Snodgrass follows; it is Earthside imposition
of civil, not criminal, law that the Systemites find most threatening. But
the American Indian analogy does not break down here; the Commerce
Clause and the Just Compensation Clause, mentioned above, have been
interpreted in Indian country much as the colonists fear for the System.
The Indian Commerce Clause68 has come to be pretty much a carte
blanche for Congress to deal with the Indian tribes as it sees fit. 69 As
Professor Newton has written, "Whatever Congress wants, Congress
gets .... "70 And the Just Compensation
Clause does not protect abo71
riginal land from federal takings.
But it is not something as elegant as constitutional law that scares the
Systemites; it is the mundane matters of civil procedure: the major
Earthside intrusion is the very establishment of the federal court itself,
with its ability to resolve private disputes. The two cases upon which
the plot turns are a suit for an injunction with the government as the
plaintiff, and one for damages with the government as the defendant.

63. See generally

ROBERT

INDIAN LAW 137-64 (3d ed.

N. CLINTON, NELL JESSUP NEWTON & MONROE EDWIN PRICE, AMERICAN
1991) ("The Uneven History of Federal Indian Policy: Politics, As-

similation and Autonomy").
64. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
65. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
66. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 556.
67. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 13, 1152 (1988).
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
69. See, e.g., United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978). See generally, Robert A. Williams,
Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law, 1986 Wisc. L. REV. 219; see also Robert Laurence,
Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ. L REV.
413 (1988).
70. Nell J. Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope and Limitations, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 195, 285 (1984).
71. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). The Fifth Amendment, or
something like it, does give some protection against the abrogation of Indian treaties. See United
States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
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Still the Indian law analogy holds, for the question of the proper resolution
72
of reservation disputes in the white man's courts is an active one.
Professor Judith Resnik has explored these issues in great richness in
her article Dependent Sovereigns.7 3 As she notes:
The task for federal courts' jurisprudence is to understand what might
be meant by a claim of allegiance to more than one sovereign and
what meaning, if any, inheres in the idea of states as "sovereigns."
In an array of circumstances, federal courts' jurisprudence must question whether shared and concurrent jurisdiction remains viable and
must explore whether to embrace or resist the pressure towards nationalization and homogenization. Are the states really coherent descriptions of viable political entities, or are they a fiction left over
from an earlier era? Will and should the federal government tolerate

sustained deviation from its norms? Are the forces of centralization
and assimilation so great that the only laws that matter, ultimately,
are national laws? Should the country strive to have a central gov-

ernment (with some measure of decentralization or delegation) or try
to preserve some form of distinction between governments and encourage74multiple sovereignties, multiple court systems, and multiple

norms?

In Dependent Sovereigns, Professor Resnik uses the existence of American Indian tribes to explore the answers to these questions, on the theory
that it is with respect to these old, vulnerable governments that the
dominant society's tolerance for difference is most tested. It is when
Indian governments act and the federal courts react that we learn the
most, in Professor Resnik's insightful view, about federalism and the
role the federal courts play in it.
In 20th century America, these issues are raised by conflicting legal
choices made by the dominant society and the much older tribal societies
now within its boundaries. In Circuit, Ms. Snodgrass has created a future
when the same questions are raised by the existence of a new Systemite
society outside the borders of the center. The government aloft is physically
an "outside" one; one, in fact which is so libertarian that it is hard

72. For an analysis of federal court jurisdiction over reservation matters, see Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (no federal jurisdiction exists over claims under the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03); Hot Oil Serv., Inc. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966) (no
federal diversity jurisdiction exists when Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1958), would prevent state
court jurisdiction); Poitra v. DeMarrias, 502 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974) (the opposite); Annis v. Dewey
County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D. 1971) (enforcement of judgment by federal marshall on
the reservation is permitted).
With respect to suits in state courts over reservation transactions, see Williams, 358 U.S. 217
(state court has no subject matter jurisdiction of a suit by a non-Indian plaintiff over a reservation
debt owed by an Indian defendant); Joe v. Marcum, 621 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1980) (garnishment
may not proceed in state court against a non-Indian, reservation employer of the Indian defendant);
Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g (1), 467 U.S. 138 (1984); Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold
Eng'g (II), 476 U.S. 877 (1986) (together holding that state court has jurisdiction of a suit by a
tribe as plaintiff against a non-Indian defendant over a reservation transaction).

73. Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States and the Federal CoUrts, 56 f.
L. REV. 671 (1989).

CHI.

74. Id.at 689-90.
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even to call it a "government." In the System, it appears that only the
individual is sovereign 7 5-well, and the individual's private, voluntary
organization called the "corporation." Nevertheless, for the purpose of
establishing its independence from Earth, the System constitutes itself a
"government," which comes into direct confrontation with the federal
court over one aspect of governance, the resolution of private disputes.
But, in Circuit the conflicts are drawn so one-sidedly that Professor
Resnik's questions become easy, which does them no justice. For reasons
that are not entirely clear, except innate conservatism and the exercise
of power for its own sake, the president and judge alike see the need
to replace the private dispute resolution panels with federal courts. In
fact, all the Earthsiders seem positively obsessed with the notion that
the non-judicial dispute resolution scheme in existence in the System must
go:
Judge Huntington, to one of the private "judges": "I take it you
were on the hearing board, too?"
Artis, the prostitute: "Yes, ...."
Huntington: "Well, I'm sorry I had to deprive you of your counseling,
but it really was necessary to get a coherent legal system out here." '7 6
Jenny at first equivocates, 77 but finally, with some disquiet, she decides,
like the judge, that the hearing boards must go. 78 Later she defends that
position:
Peter: "You've disbanded our courts, and most of us believe that
you threaten our institutions."
Jenny: "But we represent institutions that have worked well for almost
three hundred years. We bring you a level of continuity and
precedent
that your ad hoc hearing boards could never provide." 79
Notice how, from the Indian law perspective that I am urging, the
tables are neatly turned. In 20th century America it is the younger central
government with its federal courts that is called on to instruct-and
more-the older tribal governments on the correct way of governing. In
Circuit it is the opposite: the newer government of the sky resists the
stultifying influence of the dominant center on the ground. But either
way, Professor Resnik's questions are relevant and difficult: "Will and
should the federal government tolerate sustained deviation from its norms?
Are the forces of centralization and assimilation so great that the only
laws that matter, ultimately, are national laws?" 80
Most of the characters in Circuit accept the notion that the mere
existence of the federal court as an agency of the central government is

75.
"[Wle
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Compare the preamble to the 1992 NATIONAL PLATFORM OF THE LIBERTARIAN PARTY (1991):
seek ... a world in which all individuals are sovereign over their own lives .
SNODGRASS, supra note 1, at 69.
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 33.
Resnik, supra note 73, at 690.
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a dominating threat to local autonomy. Most of the characters, that is
to say, find Professor Resnik's questions to be easily solved by the
notions of local perfection and central depravity. In the sky, libertarian
freedom rules. On the ground there is this: the President confides to the
judge that the best cure for the colonists' restiveness is "an old-fashioned
dose of big government.""' Premier Tupolev explains his government's
acquiescence in this scheme: "Why else did you introduce [Judge] Huntington into the System if not to reassert control? And why do you think
our Ministry of Justice agreed to be bound by his decisions over major
U.N. treaty problems? I know and understand your efforts and totally
approve of them." '8 2 When the lines are drawn as clearly as in this nearEarth neighborhood, the answers to questions concerning the intrusion
of federal courts on local sensibilities become trivially obvious.
It is no surprise that President C. de Baca's theory of the oppressive
power of big government and federal courts proves to be correct in
Circuit. The 15th circuit gains a place in System society and the federal
court is used by private litigants. True, both the court and its judge
come to stand as protectors against Washington; Huntington enters a
money judgment against the federal government in the second law suit
without a single sovereign immunity concern. 83 But all this is only because
the President failed to name a judge loyal enough to old-style Federalist
ways. Huntington is no John Marshall and, once freed of the corrupting
influence of gravity, he becomes Jeffersonian faster than you can say
"Marbury v. Madison." Assuming he survives his impeachment by the
Senate, Huntington looks to be every bit as much a thorn in C. de
Baca's side as Marshall was in Jackson's. Nevertheless the federal court,
in theory, retains the potential for domination and, had the President
been more careful selecting the judge and his term,8 the colonists might
have been made to toe the Earthside line. In this regard, then, Circuit
seems very much a book of the late 20th century. The lessons it tries
to teach, that centralized government, social democracy, and federal court
limitation of local power are equally the enemies of individual liberty,
are very palatable lessons indeed to many Americans these days. For
those out of step with these beliefs, Circuit, if nothing else, shows just
how self-evident they appear to their adherents.
As is so often the case, and as Professor Resnik has so artfully made
plain, it is from the Indian law perspective that things begin to look
non-self-evident. If one, reading Circuit, likens the System to the state
of, say, Arkansas in the 1950's, then the fear of the establishment of
a federal court seems real only from a position of extreme conservatism.

81. SNODGRASS,

supra note 1, at 11.

82. Id. at 54.
83. Id. at 227.
84. Since the System is not a state, see id. at 19, the Constitution (at least the Constitution as
we know it in 1994) would permit non-Article III federal judges with less than life tenure. See
American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (upholding the legitimacy
of a four-year term for a federal judge in the Florida territory).
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With the evil ways of President C. de Baca so overdrawn, the federal
court looks inherently threatening, but we in this state know otherwise.
We, of course, have seen the federal courts use their substantial powers
to escort young black children into Little Rock Central High,85 and it
is only the most die-hard states-righters or conservative revisionists who
think that the federal courts did not ultimately advance the interests of
justice and humanity in that case.
But if the System reminds one of, say, the Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
with the white federal judge seeking to impose outsider norms on the
weaker, but older, sovereign as it goes about the business of governing
itself, then the Systemites' fears seem better founded.
All of this is my quite cursory application to Circuit of Professor
Resnik's analysis in the article cited above.86 Ms. Snodgrass, I suspect,
finds this all quite an amusing exercise; to paraphrase, "We ain't eradicatin' world hunger here. It's just a science fiction story." My only
point is this one, made above: Circuit's audience lies, generally, among
non-lawyers, and it does not serve them-and ultimately us-well, to
give the impression that the Resnik analysis of federal court jurisprudence
is either easy to apply or that its conclusions are obvious or that its use
is irrelevant to the readers of science fiction, or commemorators on the
quincentennary and American Indian law.
Take, for instance, the well-known case of Martinez v. Santa Clara
Pueblo,8 7 the most interesting case ever litigated in English.88 There the
federal court was made to ponder whether the tribe's sex-discriminatory
membership regulation should survive inspection under the congressionallymandated Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). 9 The federal district court
in New Mexico took jurisdiction and found for the tribe, even while
acknowledging that such discrimination would not be tolerated if done
by a state or federal government. However, the tribe being the older
sovereign, the court felt itself not constrained to make the tribe toe the
Anglo-American line, and gave judgment for the defendant. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver agreed that federal court jurisdiction
existed, but reversed and held for the individual plaintiffs. The tribe,
the Tenth Circuit thought, was not following old and traditional ways
in its discrimination against Julia Martinez and her family, but was rather
departing from those ways illegally, under the Indian Civil Rights Act.
The Supreme Court reversed both courts on jurisdictional grounds and
held that the ICRA created no federal civil cause of action.
From Circuit's too-unclouded perspective, the Supreme Court was right:
the federal trial judge was seriously interfering with local autonomy, just

85. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
86. Resnik, supra note 73.
87. 402 F. Supp. -5 (D.N.M.), reversed, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1975), reversed, 436 U.S. 49
(1978).
88. See Robert Laurence, A Quincentennial Essay on Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 28 IDAHO
L. REV. 307 (1992).
89. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
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by inspecting the tribe's practice. His ability to enjoin the membership
rule as violative of dominant-society norms contained in the ICRA destroyed local self-determination, even if he, in fact, magnanimously agreed
to permit the practice in this instance. The Tenth Circuit's fist is always
inside the District Court's velvet glove, ready to crush, in the proper
case, local insistence on being different from central edict.
Professor Resnik recognizes that in any federal republic a conflict
between the center and the provinces will inherently endure, and federalists
will have to struggle with the issue of when, and in what circumstances,
the center will exercise the power that exists to bring the provinces into
line with the majority. The novel, of course, makes the issue easy, for
there is nothing at all benign about the Earthsiders' motives; C. de Baca
aims at subjugation for subjugation's sake. It's as if, in Martinez, the
suit were seeking, not the elimination of sex discrimination, but the
destruction of the Santa Clara Pueblo's traditional religion.
Some Indian law commentators would say that such destruction exactly
is what the Indian Civil Rights Act is all about: Professor Robert A.
Williams, Jr. calls it "a highly efficient process of legal auto-genocide." 9
Professor Milnar Ball speaks of "judicial George Custers to the rescue":
federal judges and their friends bringing the Bill of Rights-or something
like it-to the reservation. 91 It is federal Indian law dogma that the
Constitution itself does not bind the activities of Indian tribes, 92 but the
ICRA is the statutory response to this state of affairs. The statute does
not replicate the Bill of Rights in its entirety; it contains no Establishment
Clause, for instance, nor any guarantee of free legal representation in
criminal cases. Nor does the ICRA contain a 19th amendment analog.
Nevertheless, the federal courts enforcing the ICRA represent just the
kind of centralized subjugation of the provinces that the Systemites fear
in Circuit. Again, the tables are nicely turned: the "judicial George
Custers," armed with the ICRA, invade Indian country with exactly those
individualized freedoms that the Systemites are fighting to protect from
destruction at the hands of the communitarian Earthlings. But either
way, the Resnik analysis remains the same and the existence of federal
courts requires us to decide if and when the center controls. Again it
can be seen that the most interesting Indian law analogy in Circuit is
the one that is never mentioned.
Professor Resnik and others find the Martinez case "difficult," 93 and
here, then, is the jurisprudentially significant part of my classmate's work
in Circuit. The heavy-handed attempt by the federal authorities to get

90. Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219, 274;
see also Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European
Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237
(1989).
91. Professor Ball's speech is quoted in Mary Ann Dadisman, Native Americans Find Bill of
Rights Not for Everyone, BARRISTER MAGAZINE, Fall 1991, at 36.
92. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
93. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 73; CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES
ON LIFE AND THE LAW 65-66 (1987).
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the Systemites to stop resolving their disputes so alternatively looks at
first glance to be almost melodrama, 200 miles high. But, with a mind
prepared by the Martinez case to see the inherent clash between the
dominant society and those who identify themselves as "outsiders," 94 and
prepared by Professor Resnik to appreciate how that clash is often played
out in federal court jurisprudence, one can see in Circuit an idea worth
reading about.
In a crystalline universe, the role for the federal courts in the control
of "difference" seems entirely benign in Cooper v. Aaron, and entirely
malignant in Circuit. Martinez is the case that makes the analysis nonobvious and important. Sadly, but not really surprisingly, in Circuit the
grand quandary of Martinez is buried under a lot of foolishness about
libertarianism and litigation 5
All of this brings me back to Ragsdale and Walden, mentioned in
Ms. Snodgrass's acknowledgment and by me early on, for the issues
raised by Circuit and by this article would, I guess, have captured the
attention of those two. I can imagine them in the forum at U.N.M.'s
law school, this academic odd couple, these two historians with such
different views of history, these two teachers with such different classroom
manners. Walden with his white sleeves rolled up, his plain tie loose,
eating an Eskimo Pie. Ragsdale in a three piece suit, hair gone awry,
chainsmoking and pacing. They both knew history, so the talk might
begin with the Norman Conquest and the Doomsday Book,9 or the
Spanish Requirement9 and the subjugation of the Indians. From there-

94. On the problems presented by self-identification of the "outsiders," P.S. Deloria & Robert
Laurence, What's an Indian?A Conversation about Law School Admissions, Indian Tribal Sovereignty
and Affirmative Action, 44 ARK. L. REV. 1107 (1991).
95. With all this talk of libertarianism, we should pause to note the 20th century Libertarian
Party's position on Indian law:
We favor the following remedies, respectively: (1) individual Indians should be
free to select their citizenship, if any, and tribes should be allowed to choose their
level of autonomy, up to absolute sovereignty; (2) Indians should have their just
property rights restored, including rights of easement, access, hunting and fishing;
(3) the Bureau of Indian Affairs should be abolished and tribal members allowed
to decide the extent and nature of their government,. if any; and (4) negotiations
should be undertaken to exchange otherwise unclaimed and unowned federal properties for any and all remaining governmental obligations to the tribes.
We further advocate holding fully liable those responsible for any and all damages
which have resulted from authorization of, or engagement in, resource development
on reservation lands, including damages done by careless disposal of uranium tailings
and other mineral wastes.
1992 National Platform of the Libertarian Party (1991) at 10. Most interesting of these positions
is the right of tribes to assert "absolute sovereignty" and, apparently, to secede, a right shared by
the states. See id. at 22.
96. The Domesday, or Doomsday Book was William the Conqueror's survey of most of the
lands in England and aided greatly in the subjugation of the conquered land to Norman feudalism.
See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *49, *99; 3 WILLM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *331.
Professor Williams has written on the relationship between the Norman Conquest and American
Indian law in Robert A. Williams, Jr., Jefferson, the Norman Yoke, and American Indian Lands,
29 ARIZ. L. REV. 165 (1987).
97. The Requirement was a document that Spanish explorers were required to read when they
came across natives in the New World. It is translated in all of its ethnocentric glory in WucomB
E. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN AND THE WHITE MAN 306 (1964).
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who knows?-except far-ranging, for sure. No matter the direction, what
a converstion that would have been to eavesdrop upon!
Alas, it is never to be; Walden is fifteen years dead. But a final
historical point is made in his stead by Professor Richard Collins of the
University of Colorado. He has observed that: "[Indian t]reaties after
[1814] . . . reflected the general assumption that the United States had
the power to impose any terms it wished .... [T]reaty terms were only
as fair as the Government's benevolence decided to make them. 9 8 The
need for this benevolence grates, but appreciating its role is necessary
to an understanding of American Indian law today, long after treatymaking has stopped. Even in ultimately deciding the Martinez case for
the tribe, the Supreme Court showed itself ready to uphold both the
legitimacy of the ICRA as a congressional enactment and its civil application to tribes. 99 The holdihig of the case was that the Congress had
not intended to exercise its power so clearly as the Martinez family
sought, but the case seems premised on the understanding that, if Congress
wanted to forbid tribal sex discrimination, the Court would permit it to
do so. Benevolence toward tribal sovereignty is seen twice, then: once
in the Court's unwillingness to read the ICRA broadly to attack the
tribe's right to make its own laws, and again in Congress's failure, more
than a decade later, to change that result. But, as Professor Collins might
put it, the ICRA defers to tribal ways only as far as the Government's
benevolence decided to defer.
In Circuit there is no benevolence at all from the center. And, it is
the distrust of the real, 20th century government's ultimate benevolence
that drives some Indian law scholars to seek international protection of
tribal sovereignty.1 0o In the end everything comes back to Indian law,
Martinez and the quincentennary. The presence of the federal courts in
our federal system engages a non-trivial issue, bringing into question both
the dominant society's tolerance for diversity and its desire that, to some
extent, we should all be in this enterprise together. Circuit's structure
causes these issues to seem easy and there is more dogma in the book
than wonder. But it's there for the reader who sees it, perhaps the most
important question for the United States in the next century: how much
diversity will we tolerate when we have the power to make there be
none?
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J. 660.

